One reason why firms exist, this paper argues, is because they are suitable organizations within which cooperative production systems based on human social predispositions can evolve. In addition, we show how an entrepreneur -given these predispositions -can shape human behavior within a firm. To illustrate these processes, we will present a model that depicts how the biased transmission of cultural contents via social learning processes within the firm influence employees' behavior and the performance of the firm. These biases can be traced back to evolved social predispositions. Humans lived in tribal scale social systems based on significant amounts of intra-and even intergroup cooperation for tens if not a few hundred thousand years before the first complex societies arose. Firms rest upon the social psychology originally evolved for tribal life. We also relate our conclusions to empirical evidence on the performance and size of different kinds of organizations. Modern organizations have functions rather different from ancient tribes, leading to friction between our social predispositions and organization goals. Firms that manage to reduce this friction will tend to function better.
Many people exhibit loyalties to organizations that appear disproportionate to the material rewards they receive from these organizations. Employees often make decisions in terms of their expected effects on the firm's profitability and identify with organization goals without considering their own economic self-interest. In most firms and organizations, employees cooperatively contribute much more to their organization's or firm's overall goal achievement than the minimum that could be extracted from them by supervisory enforcement of the not fully specifiable terms of the employment contract. So, why are they often motivated to work vigorously for the organization's welfare? Every organization faces the problem of the commons: benefits that are jointly gained and shared by all -among non-contributors and contributors -and the resulting temptation of free-riding (Simon, 1991) . Why is there anything besides free-riding? And why do employees identify with organizational goals at all? Do organizations depend entirely on motivating agents through their selfish interests in order to operate successfully? And, connected to these puzzles, why is the organizational form of the multi-person firm preferred to ordinary market transactions?
To provide some answers to these questions, this paper identifies empirically testable postulates about what motivates people in organizations and firms and about how the transmission of cultural contents via processes of social learning influences their behavior in this respect. As will be shown, cultural transmission is biased; people tend to acquire some cultural variants rather than others. Moreover, this process of cultural transmission is influenced and constrained by humans' evolved psychology that shapes what we learn, how we think, and whom we imitate. This approach offers a new perspective to the debate on why firms exist (Coase, 1937; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 2002) : firms, we argue, are organizations within which a cooperative regime based on evolved social predispositions can be established. Moreover, firms are culturally variable and evolve new cultural forms as time passes. This evolution is partly driven by entrepreneurs and other business leaders in entrepreneurial roles (Penrose, 1959; Langlois, 1998) , partly by the decisions made by rank-and-file members, partly by the firm's competitive success or failure (Alchian, 1950) , and partly by cultural evolution in the larger society within which firms are embedded. This paper's intention is to contribute to an understanding of the processes by which corporate cultures evolve. The theory of gene-culture coevolution will serve as the central tool in this analysis Richerson, 1980, 1985; Richerson and Boyd, 2005 ; see also Nelson and Winter, 1982 and Bowles, 2004) . It shows the connection between humans' innate psychological predispositions and the organizations in which humans are embedded.
Another link between evolved cognitive capacities -giving rise to bounded rationality -and the theory of the firm is provided by the concept of "cognitive leadership" (Witt, 1998 (Witt, , 2005 . This theory shows how a business conception motivates and coordinates firm members and how an entrepreneur can foster cooperation while holding down opportunism. Thereby, it emphasizes the crucial cognitive input of entrepreneurs and other business leaders in organizing production and trade. Central to this approach is the implementation of a business conception as a sociallyshaped cognitive frame within the firm that directs the scarce resource of "human attention". We will draw on this concept to scrutinize the outstanding role of an entrepreneur or business leader in the socialization process of employees.
An answer to motivational questions derived only from the employment contract, which is bound to have enforcement problems (Williamson, 2002) , does not explain how employees are induced to work more than minimally, and, what is more, perhaps even with initiative and enthusiasm (see Simon, 1991 ). An approach that exclusively focuses on individual maximizing behavior of parties cannot explain why employees should tend to maximize the firm's profits when making the decisions that are delegated to them. This paper argues that humans certainly have selfish interests. This trait we share with every organism. However, humans have a marked inclination toward cooperation within groups. Arguments based on natural selection processes are often invoked -explicitly or implicitly -to derive selfish characteristics of the agents (see Bergstrom, 2002) . Gene-culture coevolutionary theory, in contrast, shows how non-selfish, cooperative human traits evolved: the social predispositions (Henrich, 2004) .
Transaction cost oriented concepts dominate the research agenda in the theory of the firm. According to transaction cost theory, the organizational form of the firm -rather than market transactions -is chosen in order to minimize transaction costs, hold-up, and post-contractual hazard as well as to internalize scale economies (see, as a point of origin, Coase, 1937 Coase, , 1992 Williamson, 1975 Williamson, , 2002 . The prevailing view of why firms exist has been that they serve to keep in check the transaction costs arising from the self-interested motivations of individuals. It is only via monitoring combined with employment contracts that appeal to an agent's self-interest that shirking may be mitigated. Recent theoretical and empirical work shows how monitoring and enforcement schemes designed to motivate supposedly selfish rational actors can "crowd out" intrinsically motivated desirable behavior (Frey and Jegen, 2001) . We argue that what successful firms do better than markets -besides economizing on transaction costs -is to establish a cooperative regime among its employees that "crowds in" desirable behavior based on humans' unique evolved group-regarding social predispositions. The paper tackles the task of understanding how entrepreneurs and other business leaders can actively shape human behavior within a firm, given these predispositions, and how this affects firm performance and size -a cognitive dimension that is usually neglected in both transaction cost economics and the theory of the firm more generally (Witt, 2005) . A transaction cost based analysis, it is argued, is an insufficient vehicle with which to examine such organizational capabilities and challenges.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I introduces the social predispositions hypothesis that is based on a process of cultural group selection. A cognitive model of the role of the entrepreneur is also sketched. Next, Section II develops a model of intra-firm cultural transmission. Recursion equations account for processes of social learning that increase the frequency of some cultural variants while decreasing that of others and depict a firm's growth process. Potential implications of the insights gained before for the theory of the firm are the subject matter of Section III. Especially the challenges and possibilities for the entrepreneur in establishing a certain corporate culture within the firm are in this section's focus. Section IV concludes the paper.
